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FOREWORD
The relationship between China and North Korea surely ranks
as one of world’s strangest. While on the surface, it might not seem
surprising to have a formal military alliance between two communist
neighbors that has endured more than 4 decades. After all, their armed
forces fought shoulder-to-shoulder in the Korean War 50 years ago.
However, Beijing’s ties to Pyongyang have weakened considerably
over time, and China now has much better and stronger relations
with the free market democracy of South Korea than it does with
the totalitarian, centrally planned economy of North Korea. In many
ways Pyongyang has become a Cold War relic, strategic liability, and
monumental headache for Beijing. Nevertheless, the China-North
Korea alliance remains formally in effect, and Beijing continues to
provide vital supplies of food and fuel to the brutal and repressive
Pyongyang regime.
Since the ongoing nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, which
emerged in October 2002, the United States and other countries have
pinned high hopes on Chinese efforts to moderate and reason with
North Korea. Beijing’s initiative to bring Pyongyang to the table in
the so-called Six-Party Talks and host them seems to substantiate
these hopes. Yet, as Dr. Andrew Scobell points out in this monograph,
it would be unrealistic to raise one’s expectations over what China
might accomplish vis-à-vis North Korea. Beijing plays a useful and
important role on the Korean Peninsula, but in the ﬁnal analysis,
Scobell argues that there are signiﬁcant limitations on China’s
inﬂuence both in terms of what actions Beijing would be prepared to
take and what impact this pressure can have. If this analysis is correct,
then North Korea is unlikely to mend its ways anytime soon.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer a current analysis
of this long-term relationship and its effect on the United States and
the region.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The China-North Korea relationship remains the most enduring,
uninterrupted bilateral friendship for both the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).
This brother-in-arms relationship was solidiﬁed early during the
Korean War. Sharing a common border and ideology, both China
and North Korea confront the frustration of divided nations. And
while, on the one hand, each views the United States as hostile,
Beijing and Pyongyang, on the other hand, appear to crave better
relations with Washington.
Arguably, each clings to the other because they have nowhere
else to turn―each believes that close cooperation with the other is
vital to its own national security. No doubt each country would
prefer to depend less on the other. China has a major stake in
ensuring the continued survival of the North Korean regime and
may be willing to go to considerable lengths to guarantee this. North
Korea, meanwhile, seems destined to remain heavily dependent on
China for morale support and material assistance.
Despite this type of relationship between Pyongyang and Beijing,
there are signiﬁcant limits to China’s inﬂuence on North Korea―in
part due to China’s unwillingness to apply hard pressure and in part
because, even if China did apply such pressure, North Korea might
not respond in the desired manner.
China was spurred into action in early 2003 by heightened fears
that North Korea might be the next target of U.S. military action after
Iraq. China undertook an unprecedented diplomatic initiative to
bring Washington and Pyongyang to the same table in Beijing thrice
in the space of 10 months: three-party talks in April 2003, and then
six-party talks in August 2003 and February 2004. China deserves
considerable credit for these signiﬁcant accomplishments.
Nevertheless, China may have reached the limits of its inﬂuence
on North Korea in terms of what actions the United States can expect
from Beijing and what impact Chinese inﬂuence is likely to have on
Pyongyang. The most the United States probably can expect is for
China to push on to continue the six-party talks.
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Recommendations include:
• Don’t expect too much from Beijing.
• Don’t underestimate China’s commitment to protect its own
national interests.
• Don’t force China to choose sides.
• Don’t expect much movement from Pyongyang.
• North Korean distrust of outsiders may be almost
insurmountable.
• Don’t count on China to dissuade North Korea from going
nuclear.
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CHINA AND NORTH KOREA:
FROM COMRADES-IN-ARMS TO ALLIES AT ARM’S LENGTH
Introduction.
The relationship between the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) remains the
most enduring, uninterrupted bilateral friendship for both countries.
This monograph examines the signiﬁcance of the relationship from
Beijing’s perspective. First the author considers the logic of China’s
ties with North Korea, and then surveys the various dimensions of
this multifaceted relationship. Next, he analyzes China’s evolving
views of North Korea and assesses its activist initiative in 2003
seeking to resolve the nuclear issue. Then he discusses Beijing’s
preferences for the future of the Korean peninsula, summarizes
conclusions, and offers the implications for U.S. national security.
The Logic of the Relationship.
From Beijing’s perspective, the logic of the relationship between
the PRC and DPRK is tied intimately to the two states’ more than halfcentury of history of battleﬁeld cooperation and military alliance,
shared socialist divided nation ideology, the geopolitical balance
of power both in Northeast Asia and on the Korean Peninsula, and
ambivalent overlapping views of the United States.
The brother-in-arms relationship between China and North
Korea was solidiﬁed early during the Korean War. Beijing’s decision
to enter the war in late 1950 was not taken lightly. While China’s
paramount leader Mao Zedong clearly was predisposed to intervene
on the Korean Peninsula, many leaders had serious reservations,
and others strongly opposed intervention. The consensus of several
careful scholarly accounts is that “a high-level policy” debate took
place in Beijing.1 Mao’s forceful personality won out, and the ﬁrst
units of the Chinese People’s Volunteers (CPV) crossed the Yalu
River on the night of October 19, 1950. China paid a tremendous cost
as the result of this decision in terms of casualties and war-related
expenses. By one ofﬁcial Chinese estimate, the CPV’s “combat
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losses were more than 360,000 (including 130,000 wounded) and
noncombat losses were more than 380,000.”2 Moreover, while the hot
phase of the Korean War lasted 3 years, Chinese forces remained on
the peninsula for an additional 5 years (until 1958), many assisting in
national reconstruction projects.
This de facto alliance was formalized in July 1961 when Beijing
and Pyongyang signed a Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and
Mutual Assistance. This agreement committed one country to come
to the aid of the other if attacked.3
Legitimating Ideology.
As fraternal socialist party-states, Beijing and Pyongyang share
an ideological afﬁnity. Moreover, both have weathered the collapse
of communism of 1989-91 in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.
As two of the handful of the world’s “Last Leninists,” the continued
existence and health of the other is considerably important. This
is not simply a matter of China having a friendly (or at least
nonthreatening) neighbor, but it is also linked to the regime’s
political legitimacy. If Leninist regimes continue to be toppled, it
will be much more difﬁcult for the shrinking remainder to shore up
their own legitimacy. Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought
are crucial to the formal justiﬁcation of the Chinese Communist
Party’s continued right to rule, and Party leaders cannot renounce
this mantle.
The frustration of divided nations is another ideological
dimension that both Beijing and Pyongyang confront. In each case,
national uniﬁcation constitutes a core regime goal. Indeed, national
uniﬁcation should be considered a central tenet of each regime’s
ideology, and for both China and North Korea, it is appropriate to
speak of “divided nation ideologies.” Neither Beijing nor Pyongyang
can afford formally to renounce or even downgrade this priority
without fear of undermining its legitimacy. Signiﬁcantly, neither
Hu Jintao nor Kim Jong Il has seen ﬁt to renounce the use of force to
achieve uniﬁcation with Taiwan or South Korea, respectively.
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Geopolitics.
Basic geography and modern history combine to make the Korean
Peninsula and Northeast Asia of major importance to Beijing. China
and North Korea share a common 850 mile-long border. China
recalls that Korea was the route by which imperial Japan launched
its invasion of the Chinese mainland in the early 20th century.
China’s sense of vulnerability vis-à-vis the Korean Peninsula was
reinforced by swift U.S. intervention in the Korean War, especially
in late 1950 when General Douglas MacArthur’s forces crossed the
38th Parallel and approached the Chinese border. Chinese leaders
seemed to view the Korean Peninsula as a key bulwark. For the past
5 decades, the PRC has viewed the DPRK as a crucial buffer state.4
Jiang Zemin reportedly told his North Korean hosts in September
2001, during his 3-day visit to Pyongyang, that because China is
“close to the Korean Peninsula, [it] is always concerned about the
development of the situation on the peninsula and has consistently
worked to maintain peace and stability on the peninsula.”5
For China, in balance-of-power terms, Korea ﬁgures prominently
in two sets of conﬁgurations: a larger Northeast Asian one, and
a smaller Korean Peninsula one. On the peninsula the power
conﬁguration is between two bilateral military alliances: the PRC
and DPRK balanced against the United States and ROK. In the region
the power conﬁguration is a more grand strategic one whereby
Beijing seeks to balance with Pyongyang and as much as possible
with Moscow against the U.S. alliances with Tokyo and Seoul. Both
conﬁgurations present enormous challenges to and headaches for
China.
The United States in particular poses dilemmas for both the
PRC and the DPRK. While, on the one hand, each views the United
States as hostile, on the other, Beijing and Pyongyang appear to
crave better relations with Washington. In 2004 both perceive the
United States as threatening them: China sees this more in terms of
a subversive plot to gradually undermine communist rule through
a strategy of “peaceful evolution” and contain China by gradual
encirclement, while North Korea sees this in terms of more direct
military menace by U.S. forces positioned in Northeast Asia.6
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Nevertheless, Beijing and Pyongyang, somewhat paradoxically at
the same time, desire closer ties with Washington. China wants
this to reap the full beneﬁts of greater integration into the world
economic system. North Korea wants it to lessen the military threat
and, relatedly, weaken and eventually break the U.S.-South Korean
alliance. Pyongyang also wants to extract monetary aid from the
United States and international ﬁnancial institutions.7
DIMENSIONS OF THE RELATIONSHIP
The bilateral relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang is
multidimensional and one-sided. China makes all the sacriﬁces―
providing crucial political and diplomatic backing, essential
economic assistance, and limited military cooperation.
Politics/Diplomacy.
Politically, relations are cordial on the surface, but ties
between Beijing and Pyongyang have been strained since China’s
rapprochement with Seoul in the late 1980s and early 1990s. China
sent a large delegation of athletes to South Korea for the 1986 Asian
Games and followed, 2 years later, by attending the Seoul Olympics,
increasing trade investment links with South Korea, and then formally
establishing full diplomatic ties in 1992. All of this angered North
Korea and resulted in cooler relations. However, with the collapse
of the Soviet Union and the end of Soviet economic and military aid,
Pyongyang was forced to adopt a pragmatic and moderate approach
to Beijing and exhibit a more conciliatory approach to Seoul.
China encouraged North Korea to moderate its militarist stance
and reform its economy. Chinese efforts, for example, seemed critical
to persuading North Korea to join the United Nations simultaneously
with South Korea in 1991.8 Beijing appears to be having some success,
and bilateral relations warmed with two visits within 8 months by
Pyongyang’s leader Kim Jong Il to China. These visits appeared to
signal a softening of North Korea’s hardline and increased interest
in the Chinese experience with economic reform. The ﬁrst visit, in
May 2000, was made on the eve of the historic summit between
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the leaders of the two Koreas held in the North Korean capital.
The second visit, in January 2001, seemed to presage more steps to
implement economic reform in the DPRK. However, viewed from
the vantage point of early 2004, the results have been disappointing.
The great promise of the June 2000 inter-Korean summit has not
materialized, and a reciprocal visit by the North Korean leader to
Seoul has yet to occur. Economic reform in the North appears, at
best, to be sputtering and, at worst, virtually nonexistent.
Tensions reportedly emerged in the late 1990s over either unmet
North Korean demands for Chinese aid or Chinese pressure on North
Korea to reform. According to one account, in early 1996 Pyongyang
asked for a substantial amount of grain and Beijing responded by
offering only a tenth of this. Kim Jong Il was reportedly incensed
and threatened to “play the Taiwan card” unless China was
forthcoming on an even broader set of demands. Beijing regretted
that it was unable to meet all these requests but did offer a more
comprehensive package.9 Pyongyang apparently was molliﬁed.
According to another account, a team of Chinese agricultural experts,
who visited North Korea in the spring of 1997 under the auspices of
the UN Development Program, recommended that their hosts adopt
Chinese style reforms without delay. Pyongyang responded by
calling Deng Xiaoping a traitor to socialism. Beijing took umbrage
and threatened to halt its food aid. Pyongyang responded by
initiating talks with Taiwan on the subject of opening direct air
links between Taipei and Pyongyang. After the Chinese dropped its
threat, the North Koreans broke off talks.10 Signiﬁcantly, but perhaps
unrelatedly, Beijing also permitted Pyongyang to open a consulate
in the newly acquired Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong.
Although it is impossible to verify these reports, they indicate the
existence of strains in the relationship. So far, these tensions have
proved manageable.11
Nevertheless, relations between the PRC and DPRK appear to
have warmed since 1999.12 Efforts on both sides to be more cordial
are evident in President Jiang Zemin’s September 2001 visit to
Pyongyang―China’s ﬁrst head of state visit to North Korea in a
decade (the last was by PRC President Yang Shangkun in 1992)
and the ﬁrst since Beijing normalized relations with Seoul. The
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term “friendly” now regularly is employed by top ofﬁcials from
both sides to characterize their relationship. Both Jiang Zemin and
President Kim Yong Nam of the Supreme People’s Assembly used
the adjective in their discussions during Jiang’s September 2001
Pyongyang visit.13
But the PRC-DPRK relationship continues to blow hot and cold.
While Kim Jong Il reportedly is keen to have Chinese President
Hu Jintao visit Pyongyang in the near future and has issued an
invitation, no high-level Chinese leader was invited to attend the
DPRK’s 55th annual national celebration in early September 2003.
The PRC was represented by the President of the Chinese People’s
Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries, Chen Haosu.
While media reports have suggested this was an intentional snub by
China, it actually appears to be a snub by North Korea who did not
invite any senior Chinese leader.14 In any event, it probably suited
Beijing not to have any senior leader photographed next to Kim Jong
Il on such a nominally festive occasion.
Economics.
North Korea is essentially an economic basket case―the result
of wrong-headed Stalinist policies, bad weather, and the cut off
of Soviet aid in 1991.15 Estimates are that since 1990 the DPRK has
registered negative economic growth. Since 1988 Pyongyang’s
foreign trade has shrunk and has suffered an overall trade deﬁcit
every year since 1985. It has yet to recover from the sudden drop in
two-way trade with the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
(USSR), which stood at an estimated U.S.$2.56 billion in 1990 and
then a year later plunged to about U.S.$365 million. Indeed, since
1995 two-way trade with Russia has remained well under U.S.$100
million annually.16
China has failed to take the place of the Soviet Union for North
Korea, although Beijing has become Pyongyang’s most important
trading partner and economic patron. The PRC currently provides
considerable aid. Two-way trade with China constitutes about
one-third of North Korea’s entire trade, although this amount
constitutes only about 3 percent of China’s trade with South Korea
and approximately 1 percent of China’s total trade volume. Prior
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to the Agreed Framework of 1994, shipments of oil and of Western
aid and since the suspension of oil deliveries by the United States
in December 2002, Beijing was thought to be providing about
three-quarters of Pyongyang’s petroleum and food imports.17
Pyongyang’s imports from China since 1985 have hovered between
approximately U.S.$329 million and U.S.$600 million annually.
Meanwhile, the DPRK’s exports to the PRC have ﬂuctuated wildly―a
reﬂection of Pyongyang’s erratic economic performance―from a low
in 1999 of U.S.$41.7 million to a high of U.S.$297 million in 1993.18
North Korea’s trade deﬁcits with China are sizeable and growing:
estimated at U.S.$4.5 billion between 1990 and 2002 (Pyongyang has
imported U.S.$6.1 billion from Beijing but only exported U.S.$1.7
billion), with an average annual bilateral deﬁcit since 1995 of more
than U.S.$350 million.19 Smuggling and unofﬁcial trade across the
PRC-DPRK border seem commonplace, and this commerce may be
equal to the value of at least half of the “ofﬁcial” ﬁgure.20
Illegal population ﬂows are also common occurrences along
the China-North Korea border. As many as 300,000 North Korean
refugees currently live a perilous existence in China.21 Some are
temporary visitors―one member of a family earning desperately
needed cash or food to take back to other family members remaining
in North Korea; others are seeking more permanent sanctuary in
China. A signiﬁcant number of the refugees are children―either
orphaned or abandoned by parents at their wits’ end. Of those
children who do remain north of the Yalu River, some are adopted by
childless Chinese couples. A sizeable number of the refugees appear
to be women, and many are either forced (or sold by their families)
into prostitution or marriage to poor Manchurian peasants unable to
ﬁnd Chinese wives.22 Other North Koreans provide a cheap source of
factory labor for Chinese businesses in Northeast China. They tend
to be exploited by factory managers who pay them extremely low
wages and provide terrible living and working conditions because
they know these unfortunates are powerless illegal aliens subject to
immediate deportation from China.23
Many Chinese analysts stress the signiﬁcance of multiple steps
North Korea has taken in an apparent effort to make economic
reforms.24 In mid-2002, for example, Pyongyang lifted domestic price
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controls and promised wage increases, but the result was a bout of
severe inﬂation without any improvement in people’s lives or an
amelioration of the country’s disastrous economic predicament.
Conditions may not be as dire as they were in the mid-1990s, but
malnutrition is still widespread and aid from foreign donors has
declined.25
Then, in late September 2002, North Korea announced the
appointment of Yang Bin, a ﬂamboyant China-based entrepreneur
and naturalized Dutch citizen, to run the Sinuijiu foreign trade and
investment zone on the border, overriding prior consultation with
China. Beijing had made its opposition clear―reportedly telling
Pyongyang that Yang was a criminal. When North Korea ignored
its neighbor’s wishes, China made its displeasure known―ﬁrst
detaining Yang in October 2002, and charging him with bribery,
fraud, and illegally appropriating land the following month―
effectively freezing the project.26 Yang was sentenced to 18 years in
prison for bribery, tax evasion, and illegal use of land in July 2003.
His judicial appeal in September 2003 (shown on Chinese television)
was rejected. While Yang’s case should also be viewed as part of a
larger crackdown on corruption, it was also undoubtedly aimed at
registering China’s displeasure with North Korea.27
Military.
Relations between the Korean People’s Army (KPA) and the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have declined precipitously in
terms of the frequency, level, and substance since the days of the
Korean War and, in particular, since the death of Kim Il Sung in
1994. While regular military-to-military visits continue, the close
cooperation seems to have given way to symbolism and ceremony.
Many of the PLA ﬁgures visiting North Korea in recent years
are described as being on “goodwill delegations.”28 Beijing has
simultaneously, over the past decade, in line with its “two Koreas”
policy, developed noteworthy defense ties with Seoul: high level
visits, functional exchanges, and research cooperation.29 A key
indication of this was the visit by the South Korean defense minister
to China in August 1999, and his Chinese counterpart reciprocated
the following January. Efforts to repair military-to-military ties with
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North Korea are evident by PRC Defense Minister Chi Haotian’s
visit to Pyongyang in September 2000 to commemorate the 50th
anniversary of China’s intervention in the Korean War. More
recently, in mid-August 2003, General Xu Caihou, Director of the
General Political Department and vice chair of the CMC, journeyed
to Pyongyang. While some Chinese analysts insisted this was a
“routine visit,” others have labeled it as far from an ordinary series
of ofﬁce calls. Xu reportedly met not only with Marshal Jo Myong
Rok, vice chairman of the DRPK National Defense Council (and
director of the KPA’s GPD), but also with none other than Kim Jong
Il. The Chinese used Xu’s visit (along with other civilian visits) to
gauge the climate in Pyongyang, while the North Koreans requested
closer cooperation and exchanges between the KPA and PLA.30
Reportedly, China has provided some degree of technical
assistance for North Korean satellite and missile programs.31
Moreover, according to media reports U.S. intelligence believes that
Beijing may have been providing indirect assistance to Pyongyang’s
nuclear program until very recently.32 In response to these reports,
since mid-2002 China has issued two sets of stricter export control
regulations on the export of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)related technologies and, on the heels of North Korea’s October
nuclear confession to the United States, tightened restrictions on an
existing third set of regulations.33
THE CREEPING NUCLEAR CRISIS
The current creeping nuclear crisis is the second such event on
the Korean Peninsula in the space of a decade. The latest nuclear
crisis emerged in October 2002 when DPRK Vice Foreign Minister
Kang Sok Ju confessed to visiting U.S. Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asia James Kelly that his country did have an ongoing
nuclear weapons program. The ﬁrst nuclear crisis ignited in March
1993 when North Korea announced its intention to withdraw from
the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Negotiations between
Pyongyang and Washington reached an impasse, and hostilities
in 1994 were only averted by an 11th-hour deal. The outcome was
the Agreed Framework of October 1994 whereby the United States
agreed to help North Korea build two light water nuclear reactors
9

in exchange for Pyongyang scrapping its own effort to build
graphite nuclear reactors which were thought to be more easily
used to produce a weaponized nuclear capability. This accord led
to the establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO) with the participation of South Korea, Japan,
and the European Union to oversee the project.
The current crisis continues as of early 2004. The United States has
adopted a low-keyed approach to the current situation. Responding
to the revelation, President George W. Bush insisted on December
31, 2002, that the North Korean situation constituted a “diplomatic
showdown” rather than a “military showdown” and hoped it would
be resolved “peacefully.”34 In the administration’s view, in contrast
to the confrontation with Baghdad, handling Pyongyang required
a political and multilateral approach. While there has been no
escalation of conﬂict, at the same time there has been no resolution
resulting in a “creeping” crisis.
The Limits of Chinese Inﬂuence.
In the face of North Korean posturing and insistence on direct
bilateral talks with the United States, Washington continued to insist
that multilateral talks with Pyongyang involving other concerned
capitals such as Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo and Moscow were the only
way forward. The Bush administration pressed countries, notably
China, to exert inﬂuence on North Korea. The assumptions were
ﬁrst that Beijing had signiﬁcant inﬂuence on Pyongyang and was
prepared to use it; and, second, that Beijing’s goals regarding North
Korea were the same or at least similar to those of Washington.
These assumptions are questionable. Indeed, while China probably
has more inﬂuence on North Korea than any other country, this
inﬂuence actually seems rather limited, and China’s priorities
regarding North Korea have tended to be quite different to those of
the United States.
The world may have witnessed the furthest extent of Beijing’s
inﬂuence on Pyongyang in 2003 and early 2004. China facilitated,
hosted, and participated in the April 23-25, 2003, talks between
Washington and Pyongyang, and six-party talks on August 27-29,
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2003, and February 25-27, 2004. The six parties are China, Japan,
North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States. China
deserves considerable credit not only for persuading North Korea
to be more ﬂexible on the format of the talks, but also for getting
the North Koreans actually to show up. Pyongyang had insisted
for months that it would only talk to Washington one-on-one,
and Washington had been just as adamant that any talks must be
multilateral. In mid-January 2003 China offered to host talks between
North Korea and the United States. Beijing persisted in prodding
and coaxing Pyongyang to be more open on its approach to dialogue
with Washington. The result was that North Korea announced in
mid-April 2003 that it was willing to consider various formats for the
talks and shortly thereafter participated in three-party talks held in
Beijing.
A Unique Conﬂuence of Conditions.
The outcome of Chinese pressure in this instance is due to what is
very likely a unique set of conditions. It is important to put China’s
diplomatic efforts in 2003 in full perspective―Beijing’s sustained
efforts to bring Washington and Pyongyang to the same table are
unprecedented. China has never before undertaken such an activist
diplomatic initiative solely on its own initiative. Beijing literally
stuck its neck out: by Chinese standards of excessive caution, it took
an enormously bold and risky step well outside of its normal comfort
zone. It could be argued that China had little to lose because even if
this attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis had failed
miserably, Beijing only would have been widely applauded for its
efforts. Nevertheless, China’s efforts are nothing short of highly
unusual. The closest Beijing has come to this kind of self-initiated
diplomatic activism is in its leading role in the formation of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in June 2001. But in this
earlier case, Chinese efforts entailed bringing together neighboring
countries that enjoyed good relations without a legacy of hostility
and with a recent track record of conﬁdence and trust-building
measures including landmark steps at demilitarization. By contrast,
in the case of North Korea, the primary actors had a long history of
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hostilities and antagonisms, and substantial mutual mistrust and
suspicion. Certainly, some analysts stress that in recent years China
has become a more conﬁdent international actor, more willing to
participate in both multilateral and bilateral settings.35
Nevertheless, prior to January 2003, China had displayed no
interest in taking an activist and leading role on the Korean crisis.
What brought on this sudden burst of high energy activity? The
answer seems to lie in the unique conﬂuence of three conditions.
The ﬁrst was the impending and then actual Iraq war. This had a
signiﬁcant and sobering impact on both China and North Korea.
Both regimes were extremely concerned about what the United
States would do next. The result was a sudden sense of urgency
on the part of Beijing and Pyongyang to remove any excuse for
the United States to use military power on the Korean Peninsula.
China’s perceived sense of crisis can be gauged by Beijing’s reported
decision in early 2003 to establish a leading small group on North
Korea.36
Second, China had thought more seriously about the strategic
consequences of a nuclearized North Korea and began to recognize
the disturbing ramiﬁcations of this.37 Some Chinese security analysts
grasped that Bejing’s hierarchy of priorities vis-à-vis Pyongyang
might be illusory. That is, China’s number one priority of keeping
the regime aﬂoat might be in doubt if North Korea went nuclear. A
nuclearized Pyongyang could mean the end of the regime because
this development could cause the United States to respond militarily
and oust the regime. Moreover, if not, Pyongyang might even at
some point engage in nuclear blackmail against China. Indeed, one
Chinese analyst has raised this as a possibility.38 At the very least
North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons might trigger a “chain
reaction” or “domino effect”[duominnuo gupai xiaogai] in Northeast
Asia: Japan and perhaps South Korea might also go nuclear (rarely
mentioned but certainly a concern to China is the possibility that
Taiwan might reconsider its non-nuclear stance).39 Moreover,
unmentioned by Chinese analysts but a logical second order effect
would be heightened U.S. enthusiasm for ballistic missile defense.40
Third, China was also beginning to realize the extent of the
economic cost of continued tensions on the peninsula. This is not

12

only measured in terms of China’s signiﬁcant largesse to prop up
North Korea’s collapsed economy, but also in terms of the potential
damage to China’s economy of prolonged instability on the
peninsula and the fallout on South Korea’s economic performance.41
The impact of the protracted Pyongyang nuclear crisis was being
felt in Seoul, and Beijing feared this might impinge on South Korea’s
burgeoning economic relationship with China.
The Iraq war was almost certainly the most important condition,
and the one that motivated both China and North Korea to act. But
the further away from the end of major combat operations we get,
declared by President Bush on May 1, 2003, the more the “shock and
awe” value of the highly successful military victory in Operation
IRAQI FREEDOM recedes. By the autumn of 2003, the sense of
urgency in addressing the North Korean nuclear crisis that China
exhibited in the spring and summer seemed to have evaporated.
Chinese analysts in civilian and military research institutes in
Beijing with whom the author held discussions in September 2003
seemed―with one notable exception―generally comfortable with a
very gradual approach to resolving the crises. The consensus was
that there was no reason to rush matters: the North Korean nuclear
problem would take a long time to resolve, and patience was
essential.42 Negative economic impact and nuclear fallout from the
creeping crisis, by themselves, are probably not sufﬁcient to prompt
a degree of alarm necessary for Beijing to rouse itself to exert direct
inﬂuence on Pyongyang.
DIFFERENT PRIORITIES REGARDING NORTH KOREA
President Bush has noted that the U.S. goal of a nuclear free
peninsula is a “position shared by the Chinese.” Speaking in
April 2003, he emphasized that the United States and China have
“common interests” on North Korea.43 However, China’s priorities
have been considerably different from those of the United States:
Beijing’s has been to stabilize and strengthen the Pyongyang regime
(i.e., prevent its collapse), while many in Washington desire the end
of the regime.44 However, since at least January 10, 2003, when North
Korea declared that it was withdrawing from the NPT, China appears
to have viewed the nuclear issue with increasing concern. Several
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months earlier, on October 25, 2002, then PRC President Jiang Zemin,
speaking at a joint press conference with President Bush, confessed
that China was “completely in the dark” about North Korea’s nuclear
program. China’s leaders and spokesmen repeatedly stress their
country’s desire for a non-nuclear, peaceful, and stable peninsula
and a negotiated solution to the crisis.45 More recently China has also
stressed that the “reasonable security concerns of the DPRK should
be addressed.”46 It seems very clear that China’s number one priority
remains stability. According to a researcher at China’s National
Defense Univesity, “Preserving peace and stability on the peninsula
is China’s number one and most important strategic interest there.”47
For Beijing, this means the survival of the Pyongyang regime, and
while preventing a nuclearized North Korea remains important, it is
less vital for China.48 Many analysts and journalists have concluded
or simply assumed that Beijing’s primary concern (or at least a
very high priority) is to prevent North Korea from going nuclear.49
This is understandable given that putatively the crisis is nuclear
(certainly in the view of the United States), and that Pyongyang’s
words and deeds about going nuclear have spurred China to action.
This mistaken perception of China’s nuclear concerns is reinforced
by the readiness of Chinese academics to discuss in media outlets
their fears about North Korea and proliferation.50 But this should
not be confused with China’s bottom line―stability and peace on the
peninsula.51 It was not the specter of North Korea’s entry into the
nuclear club per se that mobilized China to action in early 2003, but
rather the prospect of imminent U.S. military action prompted by
Pyongyang’s course of action.52 However, judging from writings by
and interviews with Chinese analysts, most of whom are afﬁliated
with Chinese government think tanks, Beijing appears able to live
with a nuclear North Korea (although it would certainly prefer not
to).53
North Korea.
Many in Beijing would like to see the Pyongyang regime survive
indeﬁnitely, and China is doing what it can to prop up North
Korea.54 China would prefer to see this fraternal socialist state
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endure rather than witness another loss in the handful of surviving
Leninist regimes. Musings by Chinese academics about desirability
of “regime change” in Pyongyang should not be equated with
such transformed thinking by China’s top leaders.55 The remarks
of an unnamed Chinese analyst, speaking after the conclusion of
the Three-Party Talks in April 2003, are very important: “A lot
of us [academics] are telling the government that we . . . need to
support regime change [in North Korea]. . . . But the government
is afraid to change.”56 Beijing fears that the process of Pyongyang’s
collapse would be certainly unmanageable, probably destabilizing,
and possibly cataclysmic, and the outcome would be a Northeast
Asian power conﬁguration not in China’s favor. Nevertheless,
China desires a more stable “domesticated” North Korea, preferably
without nukes.57
Thus Beijing viewed the defusing of the 1993-94 nuclear crisis
with considerable relief and satisfaction.58 The signing of the Agreed
Framework heralded the establishment of the Korean Peninsula
Energy Development Organization (KEDO), through which Western
countries agreed to bankroll and build two light water nuclear
reactors for North Korea and provide the north with oil until the ﬁrst
reactor was completed. While Pyongyang can continue to stave off
collapse without instituting thoroughgoing reform, Beijing believes
that the current status quo is simply not sustainable indeﬁnitely.
At the same time, however, China desires gradual (not “dramatic”)
change.59 Therefore China seeks to nurture the emergence of a
reform-minded North Korea that would resuscitate its economy,
draw down its massive military, and initiate threat reduction and
conﬁdence-building measures on the peninsula.60 How realistic this
goal is and how far Beijing is willing to pursue it remains unclear.61
In short, North Korea presents China with a major dilemma:
the status quo on the Korean Peninsula is problematic and fragile,
not to mention unsustainable. But at the same time Chinese elites
see change (resulting from direct external pressure) as worrisome
because it is quite likely to unfold very rapidly, be highly
destabilizing, probably tumultuous, and perhaps even cataclysmic.
Although Chinese analysts and leaders seem largely convinced that
the outcome of a uniﬁed Korea would be in China’s favor, it is how
this end state might be achieved that alarms China. This is manifest
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in the analyses of widely quoted academics such as Shi Yinhong
of People’s University. Some of these scholars suggest that China
could beneﬁt in the long term from the collapse of North Korea.62
Indeed this line of thinking is nothing new. However, it is the short
and medium term phases of a collapse scenario that China’s elites
are most worried about: they fear that this will play out to China’s
detriment.
Status Quo Plus.
Beijing appears to believe the best way to ensure Pyongyang’s
survival is to shape a kinder, gentler, more reform-minded North
Korea, and for years China has actively encouraged North Korea to
adopt Chinese-style market reforms. This, China’s most preferred
outcome, might be dubbed “status quo plus.” In other words, no
sudden major changes in North Korea are desired.
Beijing is not willing to push too hard for reforms or more
moderate international behavior for fear of loosing all inﬂuence
in Pyongyang and/or being shown to have little or no inﬂuence.63
First, if China pushes very hard, negative consequences could
result for China: North Korea might simply sever ties with China or
even become hostile to China. On the other hand Beijing is secretly
worried that China’s pressure may have no impact―that Pyongyang
will simply ignore Beijing’s efforts, and China will look peripheral,
if not inconsequential, to the North Korea situation. Chinese analysts
frequently admit that Beijing’s inﬂuence is limited and lament the
challenges of dealing with Pyongyang―a proud and difﬁcult regime
that does not readily listen to, let alone heed, advice.64
In fact, Pyongyang still views Beijing with a signiﬁcant amount of
suspicion although China probably has more inﬂuence with North
Korea than any other country because of its history of steadfast
morale support and material assistance.65 For both China and North
Korea, their relationship in the past decade has been close but
uncomfortable (as noted earlier in this monograph). The Kim Jong
Il regime does not want to depend heavily on any one country and
would almost certainly prefer not to rely on China. As one Chinese
academic observed: the North Koreans “. . . believe we [Chinese]

16

betrayed them. We embraced the U.S. and the enemy in the South.”66
To put it mildly, China’s motives are suspect in the eyes of many
North Koreans.
Finally, in early 2003, Beijing appeared to realize that some kind
of action was needed. But after the latest round of U.S.-North Korean
talks in August, what follow-up steps might China be prepared
to take vis-à-vis North Korea? At most, Beijing will continue to
encourage Pyongyang and Washington to keep talking. This is
because China’s thinking on North Korea continues to be shaped by
three major factors: a “lingering buffer mentality,” a conservative
and risk averse Chinese mindset, and a tendency to scapegoat the
United States. All three predispose Beijing to shy away from bold
new initiatives. Moreover, now that the major combat phase of
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM is over, and both U.S. forces and the
Bush administration’s attention seem to be focused on rebuilding
Iraq, China perceives the likelihood of U.S. military action against
North Korea in the near future as unlikely. In short, as of late 2003,
Beijing no longer felt a sense of urgency, and China remains focused
once again at efforts to prop up Pyongyang.67
LINGERING BUFFER MENTALITY
China has long tended to view North Korea as a “buffer” between
China and the military forces of the United States and its ally, South
Korea. Since July 1953 Pyongyang has served as a cordon sanitaire.
This made sense in the 1950s and 1960s and even in the 1970s, but
by the 1980s and 1990s, the “buffer” was becoming an anachronism.
China now has good relations with South Korea and cordial ties
with the United States, and no longer sees either country as a direct
military threat.
Yet, the buffer mentality lingers in Beijing. One Chinese analyst
observed the persistence of a “very powerful . . . [and] enduring”
mentality “forged by war” and noted that it was very difﬁcult for
people accustomed to this to envision proactive change of the status
quo.68 Korea is still seen as a sensitive border region: the route of
Japan’s military invasion of China in the early 20th century and
possible invasion by the United States in late 1950. Chinese leaders
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and analysts continue to refer to the relationship between China and
North Korea as being one of “lips and teeth”: if the Korean “lips”
are gone, then China’s “teeth” will get cold. Some still cling to this
conception.
From Lips to Lipstick.
Today, however, many in Beijing appear to view Pyongyang as
“lipstick” (rather than “lips”) to China’s teeth and lips. This lipstick
is red, increasingly expensive, of questionable quality, but looks
good to a cursory glance.
The red color of the lipstick signiﬁes that the relationship has
an important ideological component. Both China and North Korea
are fraternal socialist party-states―two of only a handful of Leninist
regimes in the world today. The continued existence and health
of the other is important to each and not simply because they
are neighbors. The issue of domestic political legitimacy for both
communist regimes is exacerbated if this group of countries shrinks
further.
The lipstick is expensive, that is, it exerts a signiﬁcant economic
drag on Beijing. China is North Korea’s most important trading
partner, and as much as half of all Pyongyang’s imports come from
Beijing. China provides vital stocks of food and fuel to its needy
neighbor. The economic relationship is very one-sided as North
Korea exports very little to China. In contrast to this aid donor
relationship with the north, China has a thriving and prosperous
economic relationship with South Korea. While China’s annual oneway trade with North Korea is estimated at hundreds of millions in
U.S. dollars, China does tens of billions of dollars in two-way trade
with South Korea. Moreover, China is the beneﬁciary of billions of
dollars in foreign direct investment from South Korea.
The lipstick is now of dubious quality: that is, for at least a decade,
it has not been working as effectively as advertised and has created
signiﬁcant headaches for Beijing. North Korea historically has
offered China a kind of security blanket. North Korean leader Kim Il
Sung had good personal relationships with successive generations of
China’s top leaders: Mao Zedong, until the latter’s death in 1976, and
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then with Deng Xiaoping, until Kim’s own death in 1994. However,
relations have not been as good between senior Chinese leaders and
Kim’s son, Kim Jong Il, who succeeded his father as Pyongyang’s
top leader. Nevertheless, Beijing appears to have rationalized that
while the younger Kim might be a difﬁcult son of a gun to deal with,
he can at least be considered China’s son of a gun. In short, China
has inﬂuence over a truculent but known quantity. Pyongyang’s
actions in early 2003 have only provided Beijing cause for greater
frustration and distress. On January 10, North Korea announced its
withdrawal from the NPT; on February 18, North Korea threatened
to void the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement if economic sanctions
were imposed; and then on March 2, 2003, North Korean ﬁghters
intercepted a U.S. surveillance aircraft ﬂying in international
airspace over the Sea of Japan.
Although China and North Korea are technically allies, bound
by a 1961 treaty to come to each other’s aid in the event of war, the
defense relationship might be dubbed a “virtual alliance” because
since the mid-1990s Beijing has made clear to Pyongyang that China
will not come to North Korea’s aid if Kim Jong Il gets himself in
hot water. Privately and sometimes publicly, Chinese ofﬁcials and
analysts make this point.69
Nevertheless, this is the only formal bilateral military alliance
China has―one sealed in blood by ﬁghting shoulder-to-shoulder in
the Korean War―and Beijing has not seen ﬁt to abrogate it ofﬁcially.
The war ended with an armistice that celebrated its 50th anniversary
on July 27, 2003. Many Chinese are proud of their country’s role
in the Korean War and resist to any suggestion that the sacriﬁces
of almost three million Chinese soldiers who served, including
hundreds of thousands killed and a comparable number wounded,
might have been in vain.70 Moreover, Chinese are angered by how
North Korea downplays or outright ignores China’s essential
contribution to the war. A Chinese visitor to North Korea was
devastated to ﬁnd no acknowledgement or reference to China’s
massive wartime contribution in a DPRK museum at Panmunjom.71
It is no exaggeration to say that many Chinese view the North
Koreans as ingrates.
Speaking in 1997, Premier Li Peng reportedly told a group of
Americans “North Korea is neither an ally of the PRC nor an enemy,
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but merely a neighboring country.”72 His words can be taken as
reﬂecting Chinese frustration with Pyongyang, but they cannot be
taken as an accurate indication of Beijing’s views. Clearly North
Korea is not “merely” another neighbor; arguably China sees North
Korea as its most important neighbor, simply because it is so fragile
and has the real and imminent potential to cause Beijing problems
of such severe scope and intensity. In short, Pyongyang may not be
easily classiﬁed as a friend or foe of Beijing, but its fate is crucially
important to China’s leaders.
The lipstick looks good at a cursory glance; that is, it appears
to have geopolitical beneﬁts for China, but upon more careful
examination, it actually might be construed as more of a liability. On
the positive side, the Korean issue puts China in demand: Beijing is
viewed as having a key role to play on the peninsula. It is an issue
upon which China can cooperate with the United States and makes
China look like a responsible and inﬂuential major power.73 But
North Korea now also looms as a serious liability. For one thing, the
negative side is that “the emperor may have little or no clothes.” In
short, the world might discover that China has virtually no inﬂuence
in North Korea after all. In such a situation where China is unable
(or unwilling) to deliver results vis-à-vis North Korea, relations with
the United States might be adversely affected, and at the very least
China might lose face internationally.74 Indeed, Beijing has inﬂuence
on Pyongyang, but this is almost certainly “soft” inﬂuence that is
limited and largely “potential” rather than “hard” and “actual”
because only two outcomes are likely. If China chooses to apply
direct pressure to North Korea, it is quite possible that Pyongyang
will not be inﬂuenced (at least in the desired manner). In fact,
Chinese analysts regularly state that while China has inﬂuence this
is limited, the kind that can only be exerted softly and subtly via
suggestions or encouragement behind the scenes instead of blunt
and direct admonishments in public view.75
RISK AVERSE MINDSET
China likely will never exert substantial hard inﬂuence because
it fears the result―only a negative outcome is likely: either no
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result or a bad result. No result would mean North Korea does
nothing except to pull away from China. China would then lose
any possibility of inﬂuence. If this happens, China might also gain
a dangerous and unpredictable foe on its doorstep. A bad result of
China’s pressure would be the possible collapse of North Korea, the
emergence of a more paranoid and militant regime, or result in war
on the peninsula―Beijing’s worst nightmare.
China is risk averse under the best of circumstances, but this is
especially true in 2003. In its actions over the past year or so, China
has stepped about as far outside of its comfort zone on Korea as it is
likely to go. The predominant tendency has been for Beijing to keep
a low proﬁle and adhere to what Samuel Kim has dubbed the “maximini principle,” whereby China seeks to maximize the beneﬁts of
a policy initiative, while at the same time minimizing the costs it
expends. Beijing’s current foreign policy priority is to maintain
peace and stability in the Asia-Paciﬁc, and its domestic priority is to
ensure continued economic growth and prosperity in China.76 This
risk averse tendency was most pronounced in 2003 because of the
leadership succession underway in China.77
A transition is currently in progress from the so-called third
generation with Jiang Zemin (aged 78) at the “core” to the fourth
generation spearheaded by Hu Jintao (aged 62). This change
began with the 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party
in November 2002 and continued with the 10th National People’s
Congress (NPC) held in March 2003, but the succession is incomplete
because the new slate of leaders remains as yet largely untested,
and Jiang remains paramount leader retaining the crucial post of
chair on the powerful Central Military Commission. But by the 10th
NPC, Hu had apparently assumed responsibility for China’s foreign
affairs, and it was reportedly Hu who launched the major Chinese
diplomatic initiative to bring the United States and North Korea
together for talks. The Chinese leader reportedly was alarmed that
U.S. military action against North Korea might be imminent in the
aftermath of Iraq and believed Beijing had to act promptly to avert
war on the Korean Peninsula.78
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) proved enough of
a challenge for China’s leaders in 2003, and this experience does
not dispose them to tackle another tricky issue if they can avoid it.
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China strongly desires peace on its periphery and good relations
with neighboring states and the major powers, especially the United
States. Beijing is averse to any new policy initiative that would put
these desirables at risk. China’s six-party talks efforts (as mentioned
earlier), while bold by Chinese standards, carried few risks for
China: it actually has little, if any, down side. But additional steps
likely will be seen as extremely risky by Beijing and not justiﬁed
unless the creeping crisis dramatically worsens.
What pressure can China exert on North Korea? China could
publicly criticize North Korea in the United Nations, but this would
only make North Korea more militant and paranoid, and destroy
any inﬂuence Beijing has over Pyongyang. The same would be true
if China were formally to revoke the 1961 treaty of alliance. Beijing
also appears unwilling to cooperate vigorously in the Proliferation
Security Initiative launched by the United States, fearing that
measures such as blockading and interdicting North Korean exports
to check proliferation of WMD would only exacerbate the problem.
The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Department of
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said in mid-August that these steps
“could make a bad situation worse.”79 China could also impose
sanctions: withhold food and fuel, for example. However, China
adamantly opposes the implementation of sanctions. In Beijing’s
view, this would make Pyongyang more desperate and probably
lead to regime collapse.80
China could throw open its border to North Korean refugees, but
this act might very well hasten the collapse of regime. Beijing is highly
unlikely to do this, fearing the consequences both in terms of the
scale of humanitarian crisis China would face, not to mention being
at odds with Beijing’s consuming priority: Pyongyang’s survival.
Since the early 1990s, Beijing has faced an unwanted humanitarian
problem, with hundreds of thousands of North Korean refugees
seeking safe haven in China. And China was embarrassed by a high
proﬁle wave of at least 130 North Korean asylum seekers, during
spring and summer 2002, trying to break into diplomatic missions
in Beijing and Shenyang.81 A larger inﬂow of refugees from North
Korea would not only threaten to swamp Northeast China but also
increase international pressure on Beijing to permit access to the UN
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High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) and Non-Governmental
Organizations (NGOs) eager to provide humanitarian assistance.
China has resisted efforts by the UNHCR or NGOs to gain access
to the individuals, insisting they are economic, rather than political,
refugees. Beijing is extremely reluctant and/or averse to taking any
of these steps because it perceives only negative consequences for
China.82
Pipeline Shutoffs and PLA Deployments.
Journalists and analysts have pointed to two episodes in 2003
as proof that China is willing and capable of applying pressure on
North Korea. Perhaps the most frequently cited incident as evidence
is an oil pipeline shutoff for 3 days in late February 2003 allegedly
for “technical reasons.” There is considerable speculation that this
was a deliberate act by China intended to apply pressure to North
Korea. The author’s assessment is that the shutdown really was due
to technical problems, but it was deﬁnitely to Beijing’s advantage to
let both Pyongyang and Washington believe this was done expressly
to apply substantive pressure to North Korea. When Chinese Vice
Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with North Korea Foreign Minister
Paek Nam Sun in Beijing in mid-February, he warned Pyongyang
to moderate its behavior. Coming on the heels of this meeting, the
North Koreans concluded the pipeline shutoff was the application
of Chinese pressure, but China claimed this was not the case. The
effect was to help convince Pyongyang to sit down with Washington
2 months later. Meanwhile, Beijing can encourage Washington to
believe that China is heeding U.S. calls to apply pressure to North
Korea and win credit for merely doing what it had to do anyway.
It is impossible to verify the real reason behind the temporary
shutdown of the pipeline, but the belief that China’s action was
carried out to exert pressure on North Korea is enormously
appealing to many observers. This is because, ﬁrst, the shutdown
appeared to get results. Second, this interpretation offers a glimmer
of hope to many observers desperate to believe there is a peaceful
way to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis. Third, the pipeline
shutoff seems to be consistent with an assumed Chinese preference
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for subtle tactics. Whatever observers would like to believe, given
the environment in Beijing on the eve of the 10th NPC with the
difﬁculty of getting a high-level consensus decision to go forward
with such a move, it is improbable that the shut off was a conscious
pressure tactic.
The second episode concerns the deployment of PLA units close
to the border with North Korea. Several Hong Kong newspapers
reported in mid-2003 that Beijing had moved as many as 150,000
soldiers to signal its displeasure with Pyongyang over its efforts to
develop nuclear weapons and to pressure North Korea to continue
to participate in the six-party talks.83 Also noted but receiving less
attention was that the move may have been aimed at dealing with a
deteriorating law and order situation in the border region. Increased
crime and unrest have been blamed on North Korean refugees and
rogue soldiers of the Korean People’s Army.84 Foreign Ministry
spokesman Kong Quan denied the troop moves were an effort to
pressure North Korea. He stressed this was a “normal adjustment
carried out after years of preparation.” He declined to conﬁrm
numbers and insisted that the border was “relatively stable.”
Indeed, the move seems to be part of a larger ongoing reorganization
of police and military forces in the area rather than designed
speciﬁcally to send a particular signal to Pyongyang―indeed similar
troop adjustments were made along China’s border with Burma
(Myanmar) at about the same time.85 As with the pipeline report,
there is no way to state with certainty what Beijing intended. Once
again, it is in China’s interests to let the United States, North Korea,
and other countries perceive this as pressure.
THE BLAME GAME
In addition to a lingering buffer mentality and a risk averse
mindset, a third element makes Beijing hold back from pressing
Pyongyang to the extent it otherwise might: a tendency to blame
Washington for either creating, or at least exacerbating, the crisis.
Although Chinese leaders and analysts appear to recognize that
North Korea lies at the root of the problem, they cast blame on the
United States partly out of a sense of frustration and partly because
they believe that the Bush administration has the potential to defuse
24

the crisis.86 Moreover, they seem to believe that the U.S. potential has
a greater probability of being realized than does North Korea’s.
That is, Washington is more likely to change/moderate its stance
than Pyongyang is.87 In other words, Chinese analysts do not appear
to anticipate much ﬂexibility from North Korea and have pinned
their hopes for progress on moderation on the United States.88
At its most extreme, this scapegoating amounts to heaping
the blame on Washington. According to one PLA analyst, “the
United States concocted [or manufactured] the Korean nuclear
issue [Meiguo baozhi chaoxian he wenti].”89 A more moderate and
more pervasive view seems to be that the United States, by its
hostile attitude manifest in harsh rhetoric and a refusal to make
concessions/compromises with North Korea, is inhibiting progress
and a resolution of the crisis. Speaking a week after the six-party
talks, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Wang Yi announced to the media:
“America’s policy towards the DPRK: this is a main problem we are
facing.”90 The Chinese military analyst quoted above phrased this
sentiment more strongly: “The greatest obstacle is the hostile policy
and military pressure of the United States as well as U.S. restrictions
on the foreign policies of South Korea and Japan.”91 Certainly some
of this U.S. scapegoating rhetoric is aimed at reassuring North Korea
that China is still on its side. Nevertheless, these words also seem to
be manifestations of an underlying assumption that for progress to
be made in resolving the crisis, the United States must take the ﬁrst
step.92
To sum up: a U.S. expectation that China will apply strong
pressure on North Korea to move Pyongyang towards complying
with Washington’s demands is problematic. This expectation is
grounded in the assumption that China actually has signiﬁcant
inﬂuence with North Korea, is willing to use it, and Beijing shares
the same policy priorities on Pyongyang as Washington. The reality
seems to be that China’s inﬂuence to push for major change in North
Korea is quite limited and in a sense merely potential (i.e., never to
be used) because China will not apply direct pressure. Because of a
lingering buffer mentality, an entrenched risk averse mindset, and
a tendency to make Washington the scapegoat, Beijing believes any
direct Chinese pressure is extremely unlikely to have signiﬁcant
positive impact on Pyongyang and likely to produce unfavorable
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results for China. Even if China applies additional pressure, North
Korea is likely to either not respond or react negatively―in any case,
not to alter its behavior in the desired direction.
In any event, China and the United States continue to have
different priorities. Beijing’s top priority is Pyongyang’s survival,
while Washington’s aim is preventing Pyongyang from possessing
and proliferating WMD. In the author’s view, getting North Korea
to the negotiating table probably represents the outer limits of
China’s inﬂuence. While this is not an insigniﬁcant outcome,
it appears to be the result of a unique set of conditions and the
unintended consequence of an oil pipeline temporarily shutoff due
to mechanical problems. Progress from this point in the creeping
Korean nuclear crisis will depend on Pyongyang and Washington,
with only qualiﬁed support forthcoming from Beijing.
BEIJING’S PREFERRED OUTCOMES FOR THE KOREAN
PENINSULA
Discerning China’s preferences for the future of Korea is complex.
This section examines Beijing’s thinking regarding uniﬁcation, and
then its position on the continued U.S. military presence on the
peninsula.
Korean Uniﬁcation.
China has ofﬁcially tended to maintain its support for peaceful
Korean reuniﬁcation. Interestingly, this position dates back at least
4 decades. Article VI of the bilateral treaty Zhou Enlai and Kim Il
Sung signed in July 1961 states: “The Contracting Parties hold that
the uniﬁcation of Korea must be realized along peaceful and
democratic lines and that such a solution accords exactly with the
national interests of the Korean people and the aim of preserving
peace in the Far East.” Behind this formal position, there is no strong
desire to see this happen in the near future because Beijing assumes
this would mean the South absorbing the North.93 Uniﬁcation on
these terms would mean the emergence of a stronger, larger, and
democratic Korea with a modern military at China’s borders. A
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uniﬁed Korea, according to one analyst, might have designs on
Chinese territory populated by approximately two million ethnic
Koreans or at the very least exert a strong pull on the heart strings
of the Korean minority to unite with their ethnic kinsmen across the
border.94 Other analysts see no evidence of interest or enthusiasm on
the part of ethnic Korean Chinese citizens to join with their brethren
in either Korea.95 In the short and medium terms, Beijing ideally
would prefer a reconciled rather than a uniﬁed Korea in which the
south could bankroll and otherwise facilitate the rejuvenation of the
north without controlling the entire peninsula. This scenario would
tend to lead to Korea shifting into a Chinese sphere of inﬂuence.96
U.S. Military Presence.
And what of China’s attitude toward a continued U.S. troop
presence after reconciliation or uniﬁcation? The conventional
wisdom is that China desires eventually to have American forces
withdrawn.97 Chinese strategic thinking about the peninsula and
presence of U.S. troops varies according to analyst, research center,
and bureaucratic afﬁliation and ﬂuctuates according to changing
regional and international conditions.98 Some Chinese analysts―
mostly military ones―express the view that no reason exists for
American forces to remain after the dissipation of tensions on the
peninsula.99 However, other analysts appear to assume that U.S.
forces will stay for the foreseeable future and accept this as a positive
constant.100 One Chinese Koreanist explained that a continued U.S.
military presence on the peninsula prevents North Korea (or South
Korea) from taking rash military action. North Korea ofﬁcials
reportedly conﬁde to Chinese counterparts that with American forces
off the peninsula, North Korea will have clear military superiority
over South Korea.101 A concern also exists that a likely consequence
of a U.S. pullout from the Korean Peninsula would be a resurgence
of Japanese military power.102 But what will ultimately determine
China’s position at any given point regarding the presence of U.S
forces on the peninsula―and elsewhere in the Asia-Paciﬁc―“is U.S.
policy toward Taiwan and Beijing’s conﬁdence in that policy.” Or
to put it another way: “. . . the more that the PRC suspects that the
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U.S. presence in Asia is directed toward intervening in the Taiwan
problem, the more China will favor the removal of U.S. forwarddeployed forces.”103
The recently announced plans to reconﬁgure U.S. forces in the
Republic of Korea have received attention in China. Some analysts
have assumed that the purpose of the pull back from the demilitarized
zone (DMZ) of the U.S. Second Infantry Division is to make it easier
for the United States to launch a strike against North Korea.104
At least one observer has expressed concern that the pullback of
the division from the DMZ and towards the western coast of the
peninsula would place U.S. forces much closer to China.105
CONCLUSION
Arguably China and North Korea cling to each other because
they have nowhere else to turn―each believes that close cooperation
with the other is vital to its own national security. According to the
closing paragraph in a recent article from the ofﬁcial Beijing Review:
A strengthened China-DPRK friendship is . . . vital to the economic
and social development of both countries in the 21st century. China
needs peace and stability along its border, in order to ensure its rapid
modernization. Likewise, the DPRK needs China’s cooperation, in order
to press ahead with its socialist construction. Since both countries need
each other for these economic and social purposes, stronger bilateral
relations are inevitable.106

If anything, this quote understates the signiﬁcance Beijing places on
the relationship.
Almost certainly, each country would prefer to depend less on
the other. Indeed, Beijing seems to view Pyongyang as a troubled
teenager lacking adult supervision who lives right next door in
a decrepit old house with a large arsenal of lethal weapons and
exhibiting strong self-destructive tendencies. A confrontation,
or―heaven forbid―battle between the teen and the police threatens
to damage China’s newly remodeled mansion, and worse case
scenario could lead to the complete destruction of other homes in
the Northeast Asian neighborhood, including China’s. The DPRK
looks to balance against total reliance on the PRC in the aftermath of
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the collapse of the Soviet Union. In any case, the DPRK leadership
has probably realized that there is a limit to what the PRC is willing
or able to provide for it. Since the late 1990s the DPRK has engaged
in an unprecedented ﬂurry of diplomatic activity and established
ofﬁcial ties with more than two dozen states. Pyongyang has made
efforts to seek a rapprochement with the United States, including
hosting then U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in late 2000
and sending Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok to Washington. More
recently, Kim Jong Il paid a visit to Russia in mid-2001.
In the ﬁnal analysis, China has a major stake in ensuring the
continued survival of the North Korean regime and may be willing
to go to considerable lengths to guarantee this. North Korea,
meanwhile, seems destined to remain heavily dependent on China
for moral support and material assistance. This is unlikely to change
unless Pyongyang more actively re-engages with Seoul and/or
pursues a thoroughgoing rapprochement with the United States,
and undertakes a major reorientation of its economy toward market
reforms and external trade and investment. Thus, for the foreseeable
future, China and North Korea seem destined to remain close to, but
uncomfortable with, each other.
Three possible paths may lie ahead for China-North Korea
relations: (1) no change in the relationship, (2) a warmer and closer
relationship, or (3) a cooler and more distant relationship. What is the
likelihood of any of these coming to pass, and what would each of
these mean for the United States? To start with the third possibility,
frostier ties between Beijing and Pyongyang are a distinct possibility.
The most likely way for the relationship to sour further would be for
North Korea to pursue brinkmanship with the United States and
continue its nuclear weapons program, and discard any pretense
of making reforms. This would likely create more opportunities for
cooperation and consultation between the United States and China.
The result would also likely be a more isolated and desperate North
Korea which would make it more unpredictable and dangerous.
An improved relationship between Beijing and Pyongyang
would be the best turn of events for the United States because it
would signal real, positive change. This would likely come about if
North Korea became more moderate and reasonable in its relations
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with the United States, took tangible steps to discontinue its nuclear
program, and permitted foreign inspectors wide access to its facilities.
Pyongyang would also likely embark on signiﬁcant thoroughgoing
economic reforms.
However, the most likely path ahead in China-North Korea
relations is no signiﬁcant change. This might prove the most
disappointing outcome for the United States. Nevertheless, there
should be some consolation that this is probably a better outcome
than a worsening or severing of the Beijing-Pyongyang link.
However, at least persistence of the status quo in its relationship with
China provides North Korea with some level of reassurance and a
dissuasion against irresponsible and erratic behavior. And the status
quo also holds out the possibility of positive future change. From the
U.S. perspective, more of the same in Beijing-Pyongyang relations
at least permits China to play a role in encouraging North Korea to
moderate its stance, contemplate ending its nuclear program, and
continuing a multilateral dialogue.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY
The foregoing analysis leads to some important implications for
U.S. national security. The overall theme of the following six points
is to keep expectations realistic. The United States must operate
under the basic assumption that a dramatic change for the better
in the North Korean nuclear crisis in the near future is unlikely.
Maintaining low expectations is not only prudent but will also
ensure that Washington does not set itself up for disappointment.
Don’t Expect Too Much from Beijing.
While China should continue to be very helpful in handling the
North Korean nuclear crisis, it is unlikely to move much beyond
sustained support for talks among North Korea, the United States,
and other concerned parties. Beijing has played a key role and, as
the U.S. National Security Strategy published in 2002 states, China
does “cooperate well” with the United States “in promoting stability
on the Korean Peninsula.” But as the National Security Strategy also
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notes (and this monograph has stressed), while U.S. and Chinese
interests “overlap” on Korea, they are NOT identical.107 For this
reason, Beijing is not likely to participate in the Proliferation Security
Initiative. While Beijing serves as a stabilizer and balancer on the
Korean Peninsula and, as such, provides crucial reassurance to
Pyongyang, it continues to proffer key morale and material support
to a regime that has virtually no other trusted friends (Moscow may
be the one exception). China is also useful conduit and source of
information about North Korea. Nevertheless, China is extremely
risk averse and unlikely to apply strong pressure to North Korea,
unless it perceives a sudden, dramatic, and alarming change to the
fragile status quo—imminent U.S. military action.
Don’t Underestimate China’s Commitment to Protect Its Own
National Interests.
While Washington should not expect too much from Beijing, the
United States must not underestimate China’s readiness to leap into
action to protect what it perceives as its vital national interests in
a critical situation. As Beijing’s December 2002 Defense White Paper
noted: “China takes all measures necessary to safeguard its national
interests. . . .”108 It is quite likely that Chinese military forces would
intervene in North Korea in the event of an implosion or military
conﬂict north of the DMZ. China would cross the Yalu River to
protect its vital interests―not to prop up a crumbling regime or
ﬁght shoulder-to-shoulder with Pyongyang. The goal of Chinese
military intervention most probably would be to establish a buffer
zone along its border. In a Korean contingency where U.S. forces
might ﬁnd themselves operating in North Korea―say, for example,
assisting ROK forces in restoring order and providing humanitarian
assistance―the overriding assumption ought to be that China
will conduct a limited intervention.109 It would be advisable for
Washington to engage in a conﬁdential dialogue with Beijing about
the roles and missions of their respective militaries in various
hypothetical North Korea scenarios.
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Don’t Force China to Choose Sides.
China continually seeks to position itself as an impartial balancer
in the crisis. It has criticized not only North Korea but also the
United States. In fact, as noted earlier, Beijing continues to lay a
major, if not the lion’s, share of the blame for the current crises
at Washington’s door. In part, this likely reﬂects actual Chinese
thinking, but it is also important for Beijing to demonstrate to
Pyongyang that it is indeed impartial. Efforts to pressure China
openly to support the U.S. position are likely to be unsuccessful and
probably counterproductive.
Don’t Expect Much Movement from Pyongyang.
China is the most inﬂuential country where North Korea is
concerned, but this has had limited impact. Beijing’s efforts to
encourage economic reform in North Korea have seen very limited
results, and the pace has been glacial. Signiﬁcant changes have
occurred in North Korea in recent years, such as a 2000 summit
between the leaders of the two Koreas in Pyongyang and the
establishment of full diplomatic relations with a host of Western
states. However, these steps have come in ﬁts and starts, and it is
unclear if these represent tactical measures or strategic changes.
North Korean Distrust of Outsiders May Be Almost
Insurmountable.
Pyongyang possesses a deep-seated distrust of outsiders.
Even China is viewed with deep suspicions. If North Korea’s
sole remaining military ally is treated with such suspicion, then
one can only imagine the level of paranoid alarm reserved for a
country such as the United States, which is viewed as hostile to the
regime. Establishing a basic level of trust is likely to be an extremely
challenging but important prerequisite for getting beyond the
current crisis. (Of course this works both ways since deep distrust
and suspicion are held on the part of the United States regarding
North Korea.) To this end, President Bush’s offer at the Asian-Paciﬁc
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Economic Coooperation Summit in Bangkok in October 2003 to sign
off on a multilateral document guaranteeing North Korea’s security
is an important step. Pyongyang may warm to this proposal since it
would include fairly trustworthy North Korean friends, Beijing and
Moscow, who could be relied upon to help balance North Korean
deep distrust of the United States.110
Don’t Count on China to Dissuade North Korea from Going
Nuclear.
Following from the above points, it is extremely difﬁcult for
this author to envision a scenario in which Pyongyang voluntarily
would abandon completely its nuclear program. There seems to be
little incentive for North Korea to divest itself of the program. The
degree of paranoia and distrust Pyongyang holds for even its closest
friend (i.e., China) suggest it will not give up what is seen as a crucial
defensive weapon. Moreover, as noted earlier, Beijing’s top priority is
propping up Pyongyang, not preventing the regime from acquiring
nuclear weapons. Therefore, pressure from China of the sort to make
North Korea give up its program is unlikely to be forthcoming.
While China’s latest White Paper on Nonproliferation (issued in
December 2003) states: “China has always . . . resolutely opposed the
proliferation of [WMD] and their means of delivery,” the document
also states: “China stands for the attainment of the non-proliferation
goal through peaceful means . . . through dialogue and international
cooperation.”111 In other words, Beijing is unwilling to apply heavyhanded pressure, not to mention participate in blockades and
embargoes, against Pyongyang. North Korea appears to fear military
action from the United States and considers its nuclear program as
an essential deterrent. The idea of North Korea possessing a nuclear
device is extremely unsettling, if not downright disturbing. This is
not to mention the serious proliferation challenges this outcome
would pose. And this outcome would be likely only to exacerbate
Pyongyang’s status as the “world’s principal purveyor of ballistic
missiles” and include WMD technology.112 In such circumstances,
China’s willingness to cooperate in counterproliferation and
nonproliferation efforts would become even more critical.
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However, one positive outcome of a nuclear North Korea might
be to make Pyongyang a little less paranoid. In this limited sense,
going nuclear might help stabilize the situation on the Korean
Peninsula by making Pyongyang feel more secure. This could make
North Korea more open to the possibility of extensive reform, as well
as conventional and WMD arms control. Under these circumstances,
Beijing, at the very least, would continue to play a key, albeit
circumscribed, role in steering Pyongyang in the right direction.
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